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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 23, 1998, Iraq agreed with the United Nations (UN) Sec-
retary General in a Memorandum of Understanding' to accept Security
Council Resolutions 6872 and 715,3 and agreed to cooperate fully with the
United Nations Special Commission on the disarmament of Iraq
(UNSCOM). The carrot offered to Saddam was the addition of diplomats to
UNSCOM (labeled by the press "UNSCOM plus suits")4 and the prospect of
sanctions being lifted with UNSCOM's work being completed in a reason-
able time. However, this article is more concerned with the "stick" that pre-
ceded the agreement, namely, the threat of devastating airstrikes if Iraq did
not cooperate with UNSCOM. Those threats were made by the United States
and the United Kingdom with the support, mostly political, of about twenty
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1. 37 I.L.M. 501 (1998).
2. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
3. S.C. Res. 715, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3012d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/715 (1991).
4. Ed Vulliamy, He Doesn't Want a War, Neither do They, OBSERVER, Feb. 15, 1998, at
18.
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States.
5
The focus of this article will be the threats that preceded the February
1998 agreement, though in assessing the legal issues surrounding this crisis,
reference will be made to earlier threats and uses of force against Iraq, as
well as those that followed the February crisis, namely the threats made by
the United States and the United Kingdom in November 1998, followed by
the actual attacks against Iraq in December 1998. The February crisis re-
mains crucial to an understanding of the legality of threats, given that on that
occasion, the threat was not quickly followed by a use of force, thus making
it possible to examine the threat in isolation from the more overpowering
uses of force.
The legal basis of the threat of force against Iraq can be assessed on two
levels. The first is whether the threat prima facie falls foul of the interna-
tional legal prohibition of threats of force. If it does, then the second deter-
mination is whether there is a justification for the threat that saves it from
illegality. In this context, such a justification would come in the form of
authorization from the Security Council to issue the threats.
II. A THREAT OF FORCE?
The prohibition on threats of force has been the neglected younger sib-
ling of the more well-known (and discussed) prohibition on the use of force.
When the Pact of Paris6 was drafted, it seemed that the reason for the omis-
sion of an explicit prohibition of threats of war was due quite simply to the
drafters not having considered it. It was left to subsequent practice to show
that the parties intended to include it.7 This oversight was not repeated by the
drafters of the UN Charter who, in Article 2(4) remedied various shortcom-
ings in the Pact of Paris prohibition. This included creating an express pro-
scription of "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or po-
litical independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations."8 This, of course, raises the question of
what is prohibited. Before this can be discussed, however, a more funda-
mental challenge relating to the normative status of the prohibition must be
met.
5. See Ed Vulliamy & Patrick Wintour, Saddam 's Last Stand: They Both Blinked at the
Brink of War, OBSERVER, Feb. 22, 1998, at 9. Canada and Australia were the most vociferous
in their support.
6. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug.
27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (1929).
7. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 89
(1963).
8. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
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A. The Status of the Prohibition of Threats of Force
Notwithstanding the ban on threats of force having been enshrined in
treaty law, it remains the case that occasions involving the threat of force are
frequently less noted and commented upon than instances of the employment
of force. As a commentator noted in 1994, "[t]hreat of force has received far
less consideration in legal writings than the use of force." 9 States also betray
a "relatively high degree of tolerance towards mere threats of force."'" This
is reflected in the practice of international organizations, such as the UN,
where express condemnation of such threats has been rare.
When added to the general controversy relating to the normative status
of Article 2(4)," this has led some commentators to claim that the rule in
Article 2(4) relating to the threat of force no longer represents the law.' 2 This
is not the case and demonstrably so. In relation to the absence of condemna-
tion for certain threats, Romana Sadurska makes much of this, claiming: "[i]t
seems that as long as the threat of force does not jeopardize peace or lead to
massive violations of human rights, international actors demonstrate varying
degrees of approval or more or less reluctant tolerance for unilateral
threats."' 3
Bearing in mind that the rule is an existing treaty obligation, and, as the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) noted, practice need not be "in absolutely
rigorous conformity with the rule,"14 there is a practice of States upholding
the rule. Turkey was condemned in the UN for its threats in relation to Cy-
prus prior to its invasion in 1974.1' The Council went further in 1986, con-
demning South Africa's threats of aggression, and noting the urgent need to
prevent further threats of force by South Africa.16 At the unilateral level, in
1969, the United Kingdom complained to the UN Secretary General of a
threat of force by Spain in relation to Gibraltar.' 7 Other examples of con-
demnation by individual States include Argentina asserting that the United
Kingdom's exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands after the armed con-
flict of 1982 was an unlawful military threat. 18 More recently, in 1994, the
9. Albrecht Randzelhofer, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 106, 118 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994).
10. Id.
11. See generally Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4) or: Changing Norms Gov-
erning the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970). Contra Louis Henkin, Re-
ports of the Death of Art. 2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 544 (1971).
12. See Romana Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 239-40 (1988).
13. Id. at 250.
14. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Actions in and Against Nicaragua, (Ni-
car. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
15. See HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT 56-58 (1992).
16. See S.C. Res. 581, U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2662d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/581
(1986).
17. See MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 15, at 58.
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United Kingdom stated to the Security Council that it considered Iraqi de-
ployment of weapons and tanks at the Kuwaiti border to be a "threat to Ku-
wait and a breach of the provisions of the Charter."19 It would seem States,
while often remiss, are not entirely averse to invoking the Charter prohibi-
tion.
It is true, however, that deficiency of condemnation is an unfortunate
fact of international relations in the post-Charter era, but it is over-simplistic
to equate this with a change in the law. For a new customary norm to have
emerged, absence of condemnation itself is not enough. There must also be
an intention for that failure to condemn to amount to an acceptance of the le-
gality of the threat or an alteration of the pre-existing law, in other words,
opinio juris.2 ° This has been conspicuous by its absence. Reluctant tolerance
does not evidence opinio juris.
There are reasons other than apathy and simple Cold War politics2'
leading to a lack of condemnation of many threats. First, a threat of force is
frequently followed by the actual use of force, which subsumes it, leaving
any appraisal to be based on that use of force rather than the preliminary
threat. To compare, in municipal law, when a charge of unlawful wounding
is laid against a person, an additional charge of assault is not considered nec-
essary. There is no reason for the international system to differ here.
Second, if a threat of force is not followed up by action, "individual
States may condemn the threat, but generally the collective sigh of relief that
actual force has not been used, or sheer indifference if the threat is of a mi-
nor sort and relates to two States, outweighs any desire to condemn the
threat."22 Threats of force, if left unfulfilled, are not urgent, and States, rather
than re-opening a debate not directly affecting them, maintain a discrete si-
lence. This does not evidence any wish to change the law relating to threats,
merely a wish to avoid drawing themselves into a dying controversy. Addi-
tionally, a threat of force is more inchoate than actual use of force.23 This
makes it more difficult for States to be certain of the perceptions of the par-
ties, thus States tend to be prudently noncommittal, rather than be perceived
as interfering or taking sides.
Removed from the politics and pragmatics of individual cases, States
are happy to abstractly reaffirm the rule without caveat. For example, Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 2625 includes the passage "such a threat or use of
18. See Sadurska, supra note 12, at 261.
19. U.N. SCOR,48thSess., 3431stmtg. at 11-12, U.N. Doc. S/PV 3431 (1994).
20. "The opinio juris, or belief that a state activity is legally obligatory, is the factor
which turns the usage into a custom and renders it part of the rules of international law. To
put it slightly differently, states will behave a certain way because they are convinced it is
binding upon them to do so." MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 67 (4th ed. 1997).
21. The Cold War certainly was a very large inhibitor of States when it came to legal ap-
praisal of other countries' actions.
22. MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 15, at 58.
23. A threat of force need not be explicit. See infra Part II.C.1.
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force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the
United Nations, and shall never be employed as a means of settling interna-
tional issues."24 In addition, General Assembly Resolutions 290,25 2734,26
42/22,27 and 43/5128 all support the prohibition of threats of force as formu-
lated in the Charter. Outside the UN, the Helsinki Final Act,29 the Pact of
Bogota,3" and Article 301 of UNCLOS 3' all support the rule. The rule has
been reaffirmed many times at the general level by States, most particularly
in the General Assembly. Of course, such resolutions are not, per se, sources
of law. However, "even if they are not binding, [they] may sometimes have
normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence im-
portant for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio
juris. 3 2
The evidence of such resolutions led the ICJ in 1986 to unambiguously
uphold as customary Article 2(4) in its entirety.33 Indeed, it was stated that it
was a rule attaining the status of jus cogens.34 If any further evidence was re-
quired, the Court provided it in 1996 in Nuclear Weapons, where it decided
that "a threat or use of force" that is contrary to Article 2 paragraph 4 of the
United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article
51 is unlawful. 35 While some parts of this case were subject to great contro-
versy and were the subject of vitriolic dissents from some judges, this aspect
24. Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
25. 1949 Declaration on the Essentials of Peace, G.A. Res. 290, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess.,
at 293, U.N. Doc 1251 (1949).
26. 1970 Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, G.A. Res. 2734,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 22, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
27. 1987 Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Re-
fraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, G.A. Res. 42/22, U.N.
GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 287, U.N. Doc. A/42/49 (1987).
28. 1988 Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which
May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this
Field, G.A. Res. 43/51, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 276, U.N. Doc. A/43/49
(1988).
29. 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
30. 1948 Inter-American Treaty on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 30, 1948, 30
U.N.T.S. 55.
31. See Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Final Act, Dec. 10,
1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
32. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, July 8,
1996, 35 I.L.M. 809, 825 (1996) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
33. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 98-101.
34. Id. at 100. See YORAM DINsTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 101-06 (2d
ed. 1994). Jus cogens is defined as a "peremptory norm of general international law.... [A]
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recogni[z]ed by the in-
ternational community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted."
Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
35. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 32, at 831.
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of the case was decided unanimously, and indeed, was considered by one of
the dissenters to be an "anodyne asseveration of the obvious."36 If this is the
case, it cannot be doubted that the prohibition of threats of force is still pres-
ent and is as formulated in Article 2(4). It is important to note, also, that
States have never dissented from this view.
B. De Lege Ferenda?
Having determined that Article 2(4) represents the current law on the
subject, it is also instructive to examine the thesis that the law should be
moving away from the Article 2(4) model to allow some threats prohibited
by Article 2(4). Sadurska37 offers various policy arguments for the accep-
tance of certain threats as legitimate.
1. Collective Security
The first of these, is that due to the failure of the coercive functions of
the UN system, the right to issue unilateral threats of force should be avail-
able to provide a sanction for violations of international law. 38 There are
various problems with this view. First, the Security Council was not in-
tended to be a coercive enforcer of all international law, it was intended to
respond to threats to international peace and security. Second, the denial of a
right to threaten force does not leave a State helpless against a violation of
international law; there are many other methods of seeking redress, such as
non-forcible reprisals or acts of retorsion. 39 Third, such a position lacks sup-
port either in the text of the Charter or in the interpretation States have
given. In relation to the Charter, there is no mention of this linkage and the
two parts of the Charter, namely the principles upon which the United Na-
tions is based' and the collective security powers delegated to the Security
Council in particular," are clearly separate. Indeed, one of the major im-
provements made by the Charter over the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions42 was the severance of prohibitions on force from the collective secu-
rity system. In relation to States' adoption of this position, the only attempt
36. Id. at 842 (Vice President Schwebel, dissenting).
37. See Sadurska, supra note 12, at 246-5 1. It must be noted that she views them as sup-
porting, de lege lata, a widened conception of the legality of threats, a position not adopted
here.
38. See id.
39. Retorsion is "retaliation by a state against discourteous or inequitable acts of another
state, such retaliation taking the form of unfriendly legitimate acts within the competence of
the state whose dignity has been affronted." I.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW
471 (11 th ed. 1994).
40. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
41. U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-38, 39-51.
42. Covenant of the League of Nations, Apr. 28, 1919, League of Nations Official Jour-
nal 3 (1920).
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to plead for a right of self-help of this nature was by the United Kingdom in
the case involving the Corfu Channel.43 Sadurska takes the view that this
case accepts that a threat of force may be legal if it is to vindicate a right
unjustly denied." This is based on the fact that the United Kingdom threat-
ened to return fire from ships if those ships were fired upon. The court's re-
sponse to this was "ambigu[ous]: ' '45 "the legality of this measure cannot be
disputed, provided that it was carried out in a manner consistent with the re-
quirements of international law. The 'mission' was designed to affirm a right
which had been unjustly denied. 4 6
Sadurska's interpretation sits ill with the court's condemnation of all
measures of self-help involving force. Later in the same judgment, the court
clearly rejected the idea that the failure of the collective security system of
the UN led to any alteration in the status of Article 2(4). 41 It is submitted that
a more convincing interpretation would reconcile the two parts of the judg-
ment. Such an interpretation can be reached if it is realized that Article 2(4)
does not prohibit threats of force in circumstances where the use of the
threatened force would not violate the Charter (i.e., a threat to use force in
self defense). The United Kingdom's threat was to fire back at Albanian in-
stallations firing on United Kingdom ships. This was a threat to act in self-
defense, which is not prohibited by the Charter, and was thus "carried out in
a manner consistent with international law."4
2. An Aid to Non-Forcible Settlement?
The second justification for certain threats advanced by Sadurska is that
a threat of force may speed up a non-forcible solution to the dispute.49 This
is insufficient to justify a threat of force. First, as one commentator points
out, the threat of force makes it a non-peaceful settlement anyway.50 Second,
a credible threat of force is very likely to alter the bargaining power of any
target State, thus coercing it into accepting a result which may be (or is per-
ceived to be) inequitable. As a result, the threat may fail to settle the dispute
in the long run. Furthermore, suspension of a dispute by threats may sow the
seeds of later escalation.5 Related to this is the inherent possibility of abuse.
For example, an attempt to coerce Kuwait into accepting Iraqi demands in
43. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 27 (Apr. 9) [hereinafter Corfu Channel].
44. See Sadurska, supra note 12, at 264.
45. Id.
46. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 30.
47. See MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 15, at 25-26. See also Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J.
at 100.
48. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 30.
49. See Sadurska, supra note 12, at 246.
50. See CONSTANTINE ANTONOPOULOS, THE UNILATERAL USE OF FORCE BY STATES IN




White and Cryer: Unilateral Enforcement of Resolution 687: A Threat Too Far?
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
250 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
1990 was made during negotiations between the two States. Iraq amassed
forces on the border prior to issuing Kuwait a list of demands. Actions such
as this are not to be encouraged. The possibility of abuse here is one reason
for the rule in the law of treaties that an agreement brought about by a threat
of force is void.5" This bolsters the case against such threats settling disputes
as they vitiate any agreement reached. A threat of force is also likely to
cause tension between the two States. That is hardly conducive to peaceful
settlement; it is at least as likely to cause an entrenchment of positions.
Lastly, assuming, arguendo, that a threat can be used by a bona fide
party to attempt to spur peaceful settlement, the risks involved are far more
than a counterbalance to any possible benefits. A threat of force is as liable
to escalate the dispute as much as it may defuse a situation. "[T]he use of
threats as a form of coercion clearly runs counter to the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security since threats have a tendency to escalate into
the actual use of force."53 It is possible that a threat could be misinterpreted
as the direct precursor to an attack, causing a use of force by the threatened
State, or causing a reciprocal threat of force, which could lead to a down-
ward spiral towards violence.
3. As a Substitute for Armed Force
The final justification Sadurska offers for accepting the legality of
threats of force is that the threat of force plays the role of a ritualized sub-
stitute for violence. The aggressive drive is satisfied by the adoption of de-
terrent postures, displays of might, and threatening communications. Thus,
the threat of force, far from precipitating fighting, may be an effective
mechanism for dissuading international actors from using violence.54
Sadurska further states that many such displays are often merely for the
domestic, as opposed to the international, audience.55 Again, this cannot
provide a convincing reason for accepting threats of force as legitimate. It
must not be forgotten that when force is threatened, the stakes are high. As
Sadurska recognizes, "the substitution of threats for violence is only possible
if the actors, first properly interpret the adversary's communications and,
second, accept the most fundamental rule of this ritual: restrain themselves
from overstepping the line between verbal conflict and armed hostilities.
Both requirements are difficult."5 6
This understates the point as misinterpretation is easy, and States look-
52. See Article 52, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 52,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Article 52]. As noted in Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.)
1973 I.C.J. 3, 14 (Feb. 2), this provision represents customary international law.
53. LYAL S. SUNGA, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 59
(1997).
54. See Sadurska, supra note 12, at 246-47.
55. See id. at 247.
56. Id.
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ing for a pretext for intervention could easily "misinterpret" any such threat
to their own ends. Additionally, it must not be forgotten that such threats
take place when there is a dispute, and thus tension, between States. It is
precisely in this situation that mutual acceptance of unwritten codes of honor
relating to threats such as those described cannot be guaranteed. Most im-
portantly, however, the possibility of threats dissipating aggressive instinct
in States is hypothetical; there is a track record of threats of force snowball-
ing into actual uses of force. One possible reason for this is pride. Once a
State has threatened to use force, to fail to do so, if it remains unsatisfied,
could be seen as embarrassing, thus making a climbdown from the threat
impolitic (particularly at home). Far from dissipating aggression, threats may
well cause it. Inter-State force is not trivial enough to leave its prevention to
untested psychology.
As a result of the foregoing, the only conclusion can be that the prohibi-
tion of threats of force, as formulated in Article 2(4) is the de lege lata,57 but
also that any weakening of the prohibition cannot be considered de legefer-
enda.58 Threats of force are too disruptive, dangerous, and open to abuse for
their legality to be attractive as a future development in the law.
C. What Does Article 2(4) Prohibit?
Having determined that Article 2(4) remains the law relating to threats
of force, the question naturally arises as to what types of threats it outlaws.
As described above, this feature of Article 2(4) has been rather neglected in
the literature, and the major decision of the ICJ on the threat of force, the
Nuclear Weapons opinion, 9 "did not go very far into this question."' How-
ever, this does not mean that there is no guidance to be gained from what lit-
erature and caselaw there is on the subject. Certain limits can be ascertained.
The classic definition of a threat of force remains that of Ian Brownlie:
A threat of force consists in an express or implied promise by a govern-
ment of a resort to force conditional on non-acceptance of certain demands
of that government. If the promise to resort to force in conditions for
which no justification for the use of force exists, the threat itself is ille-
gal.6'
57. The law as it is. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW xlvi
(5th ed. 1998).
58. The "law as it should be if the rules were changed to accord with good policy." Id.
59. See Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 825.
60. See Michael J. Matheson, The Opinions of the International Court of Justice on the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 417, 431 (1997). This is true of both
the majority opinion and the dissents. Judge Schwebel, for example, having taken great pains
to present the facts of a United States threat in 1991, presents an entirely conclusionary and
unreasoned decision that the threat was lawful. See Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 840-42
(Vice President Schwebel, dissenting).
61. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 364.
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To this, it is worthwhile adding that "the statement of intention to use
force must be viewed against the background of the relations between both
States with regard to a specific dispute and in the light of the facts sur-
rounding the articulation of the threat. '6 2 It is also instructive to look at the
definition of a threat of aggression enumerated for the International Law
Commission (ILC) Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Man-
kind (ILC Code).63 While this provision was dropped in the 1996 ILC Code,
it is of some help outside that sphere, particularly as the ILC based itself on
Article 2(4),' General Assembly Resolutions 262565 and 42/22,66 and Nica-
ragua.67 Article 16 of the ILC Code makes criminal threats of aggression, de-
fined in Article 16(2) as "declarations, communications, demonstrations of
force or any other measures which would give good reason to the Govern-
ment of a State to believe that aggression is being seriously contemplated
against that State.
68
1. Implicit and Explicit Threats
While the classic threat of force is the ultimatum, such as that issued by
the United Kingdom and France in the Suez crisis, 69 it is clear that actions
may speak at least as loudly as words here. For example, Iraq's massing of
forces and weaponry at the Kuwaiti border in 1994 was understood to be a
threat of force by the United Kingdom. The same may be said for its mass-
ing of troops on July 31, 1990. Other actions that have been accepted as im-
plying a threat of force include the passage of warships in strength, military
aircraft violating airspace," providing rebels or insurgents with weapons or
logistical support,7 and the imposition of a blockade. Though the stockpiling
and deployment of mainly nuclear weapons and the policy of deterrence has
been controversial, the ICJ refused to decide if it was illegal.72 However, this
62. ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 50, at 100-01.
63. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-First Session,
U.N. GAOR 44th Sess., Supp. 10, at 180, U.N. Doc. A/44/10, 180 (1989) [hereinafter ILC
1989 REPORT].
64. Id.
65. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 24.
66. See Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 825.
67. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 98.
68. ILC 1989 Report, supra note 63, at 180.
69. See D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 843, 864 (5th ed.
1998). The ultimatum issued was a threat to use force unless Israel and Egypt declared a
cease-fire.
70. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 148.
71. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE
IT 248 (1995).
72. See Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. at 823. In the dissenting opinions, different conclu-
sions were reached on deterrence's legality. See id. at 836-37, 914 (Vice President Schwebel,
dissenting; Judge Weeramantry, dissenting. Schwebel supported the legality of the policy,
Weeramantry considered it illegal).
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is related to the legality of the threat, not the proposition that "in that de-
ployment inheres a threat of possible use."73
While an express threat of force is less likely to be equivocal, a State
acting in good faith or otherwise could see threats in innocuous actions, or
actions which other States fail to consider as implying any threat. As a re-
sult, the test for a threat of force must not be a purely subjective one. This
was recognized in the debate preceding the adoption of General Assembly
Resolution 2625 by the representative of Chile who stated that a threat is
"4any action ... which tends to produce in the other State a justified fear. '74
This was elaborated upon by the ILC in 1989, stating that the existence of a
threat "does not depend on the subjective appraisal by the State which feels
threatened, but on objective elements capable of verification by an impartial
third party.- 75 Further, support for this position may be gained from Nicara-
gua, as the court rejected a Nicaraguan contention that joint Ameri-
can/Honduran military maneuvers represented a threat on the facts of the
case.76 This demonstrates that a target States' appraisal is not determina-
tive.77 That the threatening or threatened State's views are not conclusive
must be the case. Otherwise, responsibility could exist for almost any state-
ment, irrespective of content, or a State could claim that it had never in-
tended its words or actions to threaten when that was the clear effect.
Another commentator, Belatchew Asrat,78 canvasses the idea that for a
threat to be illegal there must be immediacy, i.e., the threat must be to use
force in the near future.7 9 Immediacy may be good evidence of a real threat.
However, as this would exclude the illegality of, for example, a threat to take
territory forcibly at a later, but specified point; it would be too restrictive to
see immediacy as an essential component. The same may well apply to the
requirement claimed by Brownlie that, for a threat of force to be illegal,
there must be an attempt to coerce a State into, or out of, an action or pol-
icy.s° In other words, there must be demands that must be met to prevent the
threat being transformed into a use of force. This is possibly supported by
Nicaragua, as the court declared "a 'threat of force' derives its wrongful and
unlawful character from the element of coercion which must be estab-
lished.""1 It is also true that most threats of force will be contingent on cer-
tain demands, however, the requirement for this as a sine qua non for an un-
lawful threat of force has no basis in Article 2(4) itself. It would also exclude
73. Id. at 836.
74. U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Annexes, U.N. Doc. A/AC 125/L23 (1966).
75. ILC 1989 Report, supra note 63, at 181.
76. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 98.
77. See ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 50, at 100.
78. BELATCHEW ASRAT, PROHIBITION OF FORCE UNDER THE UN CHARTER: A STUDY OF
ART. 2(4) 140 (1991).
79. See id. at 140.
80. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 364.
81. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 108.
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the illegality of future, but non-contingent, invasion. While in some cases,
threats without demands may be mere rhetorical saber-rattling, it is not im-
possible to imagine a situation where a State, for example, was to threaten to
launch a nuclear attack as soon as it had such capacity. The legality of such
threats should not be presumed ab initio. Again, demands are certainly very
strong evidence of a threat, but they are not the only evidence from which
such a threat can be determined.
2. Threats of Illegal Uses of Force
The final, and perhaps most important, criterion for the illegality of a
threat of force is its linkage to the legality of the putative use of force threat-
ened. The ICJ was clear (and unanimous) in Nuclear Weapons where it
stated:
The notions of "threat" and "use" of force under Article 2 paragraph 4 of
the Charter stand together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a
given case is illegal-for whatever reason-the threat to use such force
will likewise be illegal .... [N]o State ... suggested to the court that it
would be lawful to threaten to use force if the use of force contemplated
would be illegal. Whether this [deterrence] is a "threat" contrary to Article
2 paragraph 4 depends upon whether the particular use of force envisaged
would be directed against the territorial integrity or political independence
of a State, or against the purposes and principles of the United Nations or
whether, in the event that it were intended as a means of defense it would
necessarily violate the principles of necessity and proportionality.t2
There is no reason to believe that the conditions relating to justification
of a threat of force differ from those of the use of force. Article 2(4) itself
creates no such distinction, prohibiting the "threat or use of force"83 without
separating their conditions. Dino Kritsiotis, citing Sadurska, however, con-
siders this aspect of the judgment to be "an unjustifiable, certainly an unjus-
tified, lowering of the threshold." 4 Nevertheless, the court supported itself
by claiming that no State dissented from this position.85 The ICJ is correct, as
discussed above; Sadurska's approach is far wider than the position adopted
by States.
This criteria probably is what saves the policy of deterrence from ille-
gality. The inherent threat of that policy is to use nuclear weapons in accor-
dance with Article 5 1.86 This also shows the legality of the Coalition 7 build-
82. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 32, at 823. The quote is from the (controversial)
majority opinion, however, it is clear that the dissenting judges agreed. This may be inferred
from the unanimous vote for para. 2C.
83. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
84. Dino Kritsiotis, The Fate of Nuclear Weapons in the Aftermath of the 1996 Advisory
Opinions of the World Court, I J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 95, 103-04 (1996).
85. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 32, at 823.
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 preserves the rights of a state to act individually or collectively
in concert with its allies in self-defense in response to an armed attack against it.
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up of forces on the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border in 1990. Clearly, in this build
up inhered a threat to use force. However, the inherent threat was justified as
the force was clearly to be employed only in the defense of Saudi Arabia or,
later, under Security Council authorization.
D. The Legality of the Threats Against Iraq
In order to determine the legality of the various threats, certain features
of the threats themselves and their context are relevant: the context of the
events; the motivation of the parties; the threats themselves; and the reaction
of the international community. All this evidence must be examined before
ascertaining the existence of a threat of armed force. This is to be contrasted
with "mere passing verbal excesses."8' As discussed above, the threat must
relate to an illegal use of force, thus one which was not issued under Chapter
VII9 authority or in accordance with Article 51.
1. History of Relations Inter Partes
The relations between the parties involved here, the United States,
United Kingdom, and Iraq, are hostile. The United States and United King-
dom were both leading members of the Coalition that (correctly, and with
full legal authority) ejected Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. Unsurprisingly, this,
and the continuing sanctions, disarmament, and compensation regimes im-
posed by the Security Council with the United States and United Kingdom to
the fore, have led to deep resentment and hostility on the part of Iraq. The
United States, in particular, has remained unimpressed by Iraq, taking a lead
role in international condemnation of Iraq for any of its frequent violations
of Resolution 687.9 Most relevant for our purposes, however, is the fact that
the major actor in this instance (the United States) has, in the post-Gulf con-
flict era, used force against Iraq.9 This has been in alleged self-defense,92 in
the protection of safe havens, 93 and very importantly, for the enforcement of
87. The Coalition of States came together on an ad hoc basis to respond to the Iraqi ag-
gression against Kuwait. The nucleus of this Coalition was formed by the United States and
the United Kingdom to defend Kuwait and to oust Iraq from Kuwait in an action in collective
self-defense. This later became a UN authorized operation, as will be seen infra Part III.B. By
the time the Coalition launched its ground offensive against Iraq in February 1991, the Coali-
tion stood at twenty-nine States. See MCCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 15, at 149.
88. ILC 1989 Report, supra note 63, at 181.
89. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter provides for action with respect to threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
90. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV 2981 (1991). For a de-
tailed discussion of the relevant provisions of Resolution 687, see infra Part Ill.
91. See infra Part Il.A.
92. See infra Part III.A.1.
93. See infra Part II1.A.2.
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Security Council Resolution 687.91 So it seems that the actors here have
shown a penchant for the use of force against this country, for reasons very
similar to those advanced in the demands in February 1998, namely that Iraq
comply with Resolution 687. 9'
On the other hand, there have been various threats against Iraq by the
United States and the United Kingdom that have not materialized into the
use of force. It could be thought, therefore, that it is not reasonable to con-
sider any such threat as serious. This cannot be. Most of the threats were not
transformed into uses of force as a negotiated solution was reached.96 The
lack of actual force was not because there was any lack of will to carry out
the threat by the countries concerned. These countries have shown they were
willing to use force, unilaterally if necessary. Thus, if an unequivocal threat
were to have arisen, it would be clear that the Iraqi government and the
world community would be entitled to treat it seriously.
2. The Threats and Their Circumstances
a. The First Wave
The first action leading up to the crisis in February 1998 was the United
States' and the United Kingdom's sudden increase in firepower in the Gulf
area in November 1997. In itself, a large increase in capacity for armed force
in an area may carry with it an implicit threat of force. After all, sending
troops and mat6riel to far-flung comers of the world costs more than belli-
cose rhetoric, and, to facilitate a military strike, such armaments are required
to be in place. However, the movement of armaments, or even military exer-
cises, may not reasonably be seen by a government as a threat of force
against it. Here, however, additional elements transforming their actions into
threats of force may have been present.
First, relations between the parties were very bad, and it was clear that
this was a time of great tension. Nevertheless, the ICJ previously rejected the
Nicaraguan contention that military exercises by the United States, at a time
when relations between them were hardly convivial, amounted to a threat of
force.97 Again, perhaps more would be required. In addition to the state of
their relations, at the time of the deployment, the United States began taking
soundings from its Arab allies on whether they would support the United
States in any airstrikes.98 While support was not overly forthcoming, the fact
94. See infra Part III.A.3.
95. These demands were repeated in November 1998, and actual bombings took place in
December 1998 after further Iraqi recalcitrance. See infra Part III.A.3.
96. See Ed Vulliamy, Showdown With Iraq: Saddam Blinks First as the Bombers Take
Aim. The Face-Off" US Intent on Making Him Surrender, OBSERVER, Nov. 15, 1998, at 9.
97. See Nicaragua, 1986 1.C.J. at 98.
98. See Iraq: UNSCOM Crisis, 43 KEFSING'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 41 938 (Nov.
1997) [hereinafter Iraq: UNSCOM Crisis 1997].
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that the United States was seeking such support itself could be seen to imply
that the United States was seriously considering the use of force against Iraq.
Possible further evidence may be gleaned from whether the threat is ac-
companied by demands, and whether the threat relates to an imminent use of
force or not. As discussed above, some commentators consider there to be a
requirement that there are particular demands issued with the threat that
must be fulfilled to prevent the use of force.9 9 This is not necessarily the
case. The correct position is that demands are excellent evidence of a real
threat. In this instance, it would seem that even if demands are a sine qua
non of a threat of force, not merely good evidence of an objective threat, this
condition is satisfied. The threats involved in this crisis contained, either ex-
plicitly or otherwise, demands that Iraq comply with Resolution 687 and
UNSCOM. This was their clear purpose. In November 1997, when the
United States increased its naval and air warfare capacities in the Gulf, it
was in the context of the row over UNSCOM. When President Clinton sent
the George Washington to the Gulf, he did so in response to Iraq's demands
that American members of UNSCOM leave Iraq, a demand Clinton de-
scribed as "clearly unacceptable."o' Later, on November 20, while explain-
ing his decision to send more military aircraft, he stated that the United
States was "resolute" that Iraq comply with the resolutions and allow
UNSCOM unimpeded access to the "presidential palaces."'1 1 It seemed clear,
the United States (and the United Kingdom) were demanding Iraq alter its
behavior in response to their demands.
It is in relation to the issue of immediacy that there is a possibility of
salvation for these early threats, for, although the threats seem to have been
made, the possibility of them being carried out in the very near future could
be questioned. As discussed above, the requirement of an imminent use of
force is not dispositive, but it does provide good evidence that armed force is
being seriously contemplated against a State. For example, the actions in at-
tempting to cultivate consent could be read as relating only to very prelimi-
nary preparations for a much later date. On the other hand, evidence the
other way could be implied, for having brought their forces there in advance,
the United States and the United Kingdom were planning an early strike.
Further evidence of the presence of a real threat of force can be gleaned
from the reaction of other States to these actions. Two States expressed their
opposition in the Security Council. In a meeting on November 12, 1997,
both seemed to imply that they already considered a threat of force to have
taken place. The Russian delegate warned against action outside the auspices
of the UN, "particularly, actions involving force or the threat of force,
[which] could nullify all our achievements."' 2 The Chinese delegate stated
99. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 364.
100. Iraq: UNSCOM Crisis 1997, supra note 98, at 938.
101. Id.
102. U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3831st mtg. at 13-14, U.N. Doc. S/PV 3831 (1997).
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his country's position very clearly: "[w]e are opposed to the use or threat of
force or any actions that might further exacerbate tensions." ''l 3 While neither
country expressly condemned or referred to any particular threat, their com-
ments made clear that they did not wish such things to occur. Moreover,
statements of that sort are rarely made in the abstract without the prompting
of previous events. Taking into account all the evidence, it would seem that
even these early threats may have been of dubious legality-perhaps only
saved if the use of force threatened could not be considered imminent
enough to be taken as objectively wrong.
b. December 1997-January 1998
The second set of threats began as soon as the first ended; the only rea-
son for dealing with them separately is that their increased intensity stands in
contrast to the mostly unspoken actions preceding them. This set of events
coincides roughly with the period of December 1997 to January 1998 and
comprises a slow, but inexorable, crescendo of statements to Iraq about the
consequences of failing to abide by the Security Council Resolutions and the
breakdown of diplomacy in achieving that aim. The first of these was on De-
cember 3. United States Secretary of State Madeline Albright stated that "it
looks like diplomacy isn't working" and reiterated her skepticism about any
peaceful settlement.10 4 At the same time, United States Defense Secretary
William Cohen stated that if diplomacy failed, any airstrikes would be "sub-
stantial," further claiming "the United States has the power to do great dam-
age."' 5 However, he also suggested limits to what could be done, and per-
haps to take the sting out of his comments, claimed that no decision had
been reached yet about the use of force. 116 This could be interpreted in two
ways: the first is that the use of force would not automatically follow a
breakdown of diplomatic talks; the second is that while any mandate for a
use of force was postponed if and until a breakdown of talks, one would
automatically follow should that contingency occur. It is clear that the sec-
ond of these is a stronger statement of intention to use force. The threat to
possibly use force on the occurrence of a contingency is not as bellicose as a
threat to definitely use that force on that contingency. It is clear that the sec-
ond of these forms of working could have a greater effect and is indicative of
a clear threat of force, whereas the first is more equivocal.
Iraqi compliance with UNSCOM was not forthcoming, therefore, on
December 19, 1997, Richard Butler, the UNSCOM head, had to report to the
Council that Iraq would not allow inspections under any circumstances.'
0 7
103. Id. at 15.
104. US Keeps up Pressure on Iraq (visited Aug. 18, 1998) <http://www.news.bbc.
co.uk> (search term "Iraq").
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See Iraq: Dispute Over UNSCOM Access to Presidential Sites, 43 KEEsING'S
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Following this, the United States said that further action may be necessary to
force Iraq to comply. As with the earlier threats, the threat of immediate
force might not have been present; however, it was clearly closer than in
November and the language was getting stronger.
In January 1998, things were developing in an entirely unwelcome di-
rection. Iraqi intransigence continued, preventing UNSCOM from inspecting
"presidential palaces" and forcing Butler to report to the Council that Iraq
was determined not to give information or allow UNSCOM to undertake
certain investigations. He also reported "specific grave instances of attempts
to mislead the commission.108 As in December, the deplorable actions of
the Iraqis elicited a response from the United Kingdom and the United
States. This time, however, it was even tougher, and it was getting clearer
that they "appeared set on course of military confrontation."' 0 9 On January
23, 1998, the United States confirmed that while they preferred diplomacy,
no options (i.e., the use of force) had been ruled out." 0 The United Kingdom
sent the H.M.S. Invincible on January 25. Prime Minister Tony Blair ex-
plained that "[s]he is there as a contingency against the possibility of the use
of force." '' Two days later, he told the Arab newspaper Al-Hayat "we do not
rule out the use of force if Saddam refuses to change his stance. 11 2 The next
day, President Clinton used his message to Congress to warn Saddam:
"[y]ou have used weapons of mass destruction before. We are determined to
deny you the capacity to use them again. ' 13
It is clear from the reactions of several countries that these were being
interpreted as threats of force. Both Russia and France spent much of the
month in diplomatic maneuvers attempting to defuse the crisis and dissuade
the United States from using force. Toward this end, in late January, the
Russian President sent his special envoy to Iraq to find a diplomatic solution.
Much of the media considered the address to Congress 1 4 to constitute a
threat of force against Iraq," 5 and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
their assessments were correct. What can be seen from these statements,
particularly in context, is an increasing resort to less ambiguous language.
The cumulative effect of this was that the threats of late January had a suffi-
cient impact on the world community and were to be considered as clear
RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 41, 980 (Dec. 1997) [hereinafter Iraq: Dispute Over UNSCOM].
108. Iraq: UNSCOM Crisis, 44 KEESING'S Record OF WORLD EVENTS 42, 42042 (Jan.
1998) [hereinafter Iraq: UNSCOM Crisis 1998).
109. Id.
I10. See id.
111. Invincible Arrives in Gulf (visited Jan. 25, 1998) <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk>
(search term "Iraq").




115. See Diplomatic Options "Exhausted" (visited Jan. 30, 1998) <http://www.news.
bbc.co.uk> (search term "Iraq").
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threats of armed force.
c. The Final Confrontations in the February 1998 Crisis
If the actions of the previous two months were ambiguous, albeit de-
creasingly so, the proclamations made over the final days of January and
through February 1998, until the adoption of Resolution 1154 on March 2,
1998, could barely be interpreted as anything other than threats of a serious
nature. The first of these was from Secretary of State Albright on January
30. While the Russians were attempting to negotiate all parties out of the
impasse, the United States Secretary of State pre-judged their efforts a fail-
ure, saying "we have all but exhausted the real diplomatic options. The mo-
ment to take a decision is rapidly approaching, all the options are open. '116
In distinction to the earlier threats, this gave real notice that the time-frame
in which force was being considered was very short, supplying evidence of a
real threat by way of imminence. On the same day, the United States re-
vealed that it would use "smart bombs" if and when it bombed Iraq, and it
had been testing weapons which could destroy chemical weapons. The im-
plication was so clear as to be express; these were to be used on Iraq. The
Times summed up the mood of all concerned: "military strikes against Iraq
appeared inevitable.""'
Threats proliferated over the next few days. During another permission-
finding tour of the Middle East, Albright again claimed that diplomacy was
not working and there could be the use of "significant" force." 8 On the
United Kingdom side, Prime Minister Blair declared "he must either be per-
suaded by diplomacy or be made by force to yield up his long cherished am-
bition to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. If we conclude
that the only option to enforce the Security Council's will is by military ac-
tion, we will not shrink from it. '" 9
It was clear these threats were affecting Iraq, who began to remove
documentation from ministries and place them in civilian targets to dissuade
attacks on them. 20 The practice of using civilian shields is deplorable, but
shows that Iraq considered itself the likely recipient of an air attack. Reac-
tions, particularly in the Arab world, showed that most States viewed the
likelihood of a resort to violence high. Egyptian Prime Minister Hosni
Mubarak was only one of the Arab leaders rejecting the option of any use of
force.' 2' By this time it was clear that most Arab States considered the use of
116. Id.
117. Michael Theodoulou, Albright Signals US Readiness for Air Raids on Iraq, TIMES
(London), Jan. 31, 1998. See also West Setfor Air Strikes on Iraq, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 2,
1998. "[There are] growing signals that the West believed a military offensive may now be
inevitable." Id.
118. See Marie Colvin, Iraqis Braced for Airstrike, TIMES (London), Feb. 1, 1998.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. See Egypt Says. Time Not Right for Attack on Iraq (visited Jan. 31, 1998)
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force likely, but, Kuwait apart, 122 withheld their support for that option. The
evaluation of many States was accurately summed up by Yevgeny Prima-
kov, the Russian foreign minister: "it is taking on an ominous character, be-
cause there is more and more information to the effect that a strike against
Iraq may become a reality."' 23 The Russian Parliament showed their concern
by passing a resolution stating that if there were airstrikes, Russia would
breach the trade embargo on Iraq. t24
On February 6, the United States and the United Kingdom gave a
euphemistic, but telling, declaration, claiming that they would use "all nec-
essary measures" to ensure compliance with UNSCOM. 125 "All necessary
measures" is recognized as the formula used by the Security Council for
force. Russia confirmed this by issuing a proclamation the same day which
made clear their position that Russia would not permit violence.' 26 While
these positions were being advanced, the United States was seeking support
from the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council for strikes. By
this time, force was almost unavoidable. This was confirmed by Secretary of
State Albright on February 8; the US was preparing "within weeks" to mount
a sustained and heavy campaign of air attacks. 2 This was an unambiguous
threat of imminent force.
Over the next few days, more States either declared their support or re-
jection of military action, demonstrating clearly that the use of force was a
serious consideration. 128 While the United States and the United Kingdom
were preparing for a use of force and identifying different types of targets,
on February 16, Russia, France, and Turkey had sent diplomats to Iraq to de-
fuse the situation.'29 On February 17, President Clinton went on national
television claiming readiness to order attacks. 3 ° Two days later, when UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan was in Iraq attempting to negotiate a solution,
both the United Kingdom and the United States had stated their determina-
tion to use force should Annan fail to get an agreement. 3' Unlike the earlier
<http://www.news.bbc.co.uk> (search term "Iraq").
122. See Julina Borger & Ian Black, UN Chief Steps Up Pressure for Deal, GUARDIAN
WKLY., Feb. 15, 1998, at 1.
123. Russian Foreign Minister Says Iraq Situation "Ominous" (visited Feb. 2, 1998)
<http://www.news.bbc.co.uk> (search term "Iraq").
124. See Iraq: UNSCOM Crisis 1998, supra note 108, at 42096.
125. See id. at 42095.
126. See Divided Voice of the UN (visited Feb. 6, 1998) <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk>
(search term "Iraq").
127. See Iraq: UNSCOM Crisis 1998, supra note 108, at 42096.
128. Germany, Canada, and Australia came out in support of the airstrikes, while Russia,
Turkey, Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Jordan were clear that they rejected such
action. See Battle Lines Drawn as Gulf Build Up Continues (visited Feb. 10, 1998)
<http://www.newsbbc.co.uk> (search term "Iraq"); Opposition Grows Against use of Force
(visited Feb. 9, 1998) <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk> (search term "Iraq").
129. See Iraq: UNSCOM Crisis 1998, supra note 108, at 42096.
130. See id. at 42097.
13 1. See John Sweeney, Saddam's Last Stand: Bent to a War of Will Saddam's Strength
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threats, these were not of the order of perhaps using force should Annan fail,
but that the use of force was effectively certain should he fail to return with
an agreement satisfactory to the United States and the United Kingdom. By
this time, there could be no doubt. These were clear and present threats.
They had immediacy, demands (the non-acceptance of which would lead to
the use of force), and were considered by all to be very dangerous. 132 These
threats received express condemnation from Iran: "[W]e consider America's
threat to Iraq as illegal."' 3 3 A similar position was advanced by Libya on
February 19.1'These may not be disinterested observers, but their analysis is
not necessarily wrong simply because of this. While there was serious dis-
pute about the advisability of the threats, in the Security Council on Febru-
ary 25 it was a common understanding that, as the Chinese delegate put it,
the world had been at a "critical juncture between peace and war."' 3 5 This
was the result of the threats made by the two parties, which they never de-
nied making and intended to use, to coerce Iraq into compliance with Coun-
cil Resolution 687.
Unless there was authority from the Security Council, it seems the
United States and United Kingdom actions were in contravention of the
Charter. The skillful diplomacy of Kofi Annan negotiating a peaceful solu-
tion in February 1998 does not alter this fact. The unraveling of the February
accord on disarmament did not take long, with Iraq deciding on August 5
and again on October 31, 1998, to withdraw its cooperation with
UNSCOM. 13 6 This led to both Prime Minister Blair and President Clinton
again issuing explicit promises to use their continued military presence in
the Gulf if Iraq did not immediately resume cooperation.' 37 In the face of
imminent airstrikes, and again in response to a diplomatic initiative by the
UN Secretary General, Iraq, in a letter delivered on November 14, 1998, to
Kofi Annan, expressed its desire to allow the arms inspectors "to perform
their normal duties" in accordance with Security Council resolutions and the
February 1998 agreement. 138 As with the threats of force of February 1998,
the threats made in November 1998 must be viewed as illegal unless there
was Security Council authority for them. It is to this issue that the analysis
now turns.
is All-Pervading, OBSERVER, Feb. 22, 1998, at 7.
132. The Financial Times declared "this is bound to be the last chance." Last Chance for
Iraq, FINANCIAL TtMES, Feb. 19, 1998, at 17.
133. Iranian Leader Condemns US Policy Towards Iraq (visited Feb. 17, 1998)
<http://www.news.bbc.co.uk> (search term "Iraq").
134. See Quadhafi Says US Violating UN Charter Over Iraq (visited Feb. 19, 1998)
<http://www.news.bbc.co.uk> (search term "Iraq").
135. U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3858th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV 3858 (1998).
136. See U.N. Doc. S/1998/1023.
137. See Ian Black, UN Fury as Saddam Blocks Inspection, GUARDIAN WKLY., Nov. 8,
1998, at 3.
138. See Vulliamy, supra note 96, at 8.
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III. WAS THERE COUNCIL AUTHORITY?
A. Legal Bases of Past Airstrikes
In helping to uncover the legal basis of the threat of force made against
Iraq in February 1998 and again in November 1998, it is necessary to disen-
tangle the various threads of law that have been used to justify airstrikes in
the period after the Gulf War ended in 1991. Western States, variously com-
bined but always with the United States to the fore, have used or threatened
military force against Iraq by utilizing three different legal justifications.
1. "Self-Defense" of the United States
On June 26, 1993, the United States, acting alone, attacked Iraq using
Tomahawk missiles against a military target just outside Baghdad. Uniquely,
in all the recent attacks upon Iraq, the United States did not rely on any al-
leged Security Council mandate, but claimed that it was exercising its right
of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. Self-defense was claimed to
be in response to a failed attempt by Iraqi agents to assassinate George Bush,
the former president of the United States who was visiting Kuwait in April
1993.139 This particular attack on Iraq is not of direct relevance in this article,
which explores those attacks or threats of attacks which are justified, at least
in part, under Security Council mandate. On balance, though, the gap be-
tween the initial attack on the United States (if the concept of attack can be
stretched that far) and the retaliation reveals the June 1993 airstrike as hav-
ing all the classic hallmarks of an illegal reprisal, the aim of which is not de-
fensive but punitive.' 40
2. Protection of the "Safe-Havens"
In other instances, Western States have claimed that they are using or
threatening force to protect the safe-havens established after the end of the
conflict between Iraq and the Coalition. The main example of this occurred
on September 3-4, 1996, when the United States launched limited Cruise
missile attacks against military targets in southern Iraq in response to Iraq's
military operations in the Kurdish safe-haven in the north of the country.
1 41
This operation was the continuation of a Western policy, initiated by
British Prime Minister John Major on April 8, 1991, to protect the Kurds in
northern Iraq and the Shias in southern Iraq who had rebelled against the re-
gime of Saddam Hussein after the Iraqi forces had been defeated in Kuwait.
139. See Dino Kritsiotis, The Legality of the 1993 US Missile Strikes on Iraq and the
Right of Self-Defence in International Law, 45 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 162, 163 (1996).
140. See G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 24.
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The rebellion was brutally put down by the still-strong Iraqi army in the last
few days of March 1991 and the beginning of April 1991.
The fear of intervention in internal matters and the precedential nature
of the Iraqi crisis led the Security Council to be much more circumspect than
in its dealings with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait-a traditional inter-State
conflict. The international pressure for action became so great that the Secu-
rity Council adopted Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991. This was a unique
product of the various political pressures contained within the fifteen-
member Council, representing an opaque compromise between the interven-
tionists and non-interventionists. It did this by a combination of determining
a "threat to the peace," thereby recognizing that the Iraq crisis was a "Chap-
ter VII" issue (and thus creating a precedent for future determinations), but
failing to authorize any action under Chapter VII, indeed even failing to
mention Chapter VII at all. Despite the tentative nature of the resolution, it
was still the least-supported resolution of the Gulf Crisis, with three States
voting against"' and two abstaining."' Furthermore, neither the sponsor of
the resolution (France), nor its close allies on the Security Council (the
United Kingdom and the United States), attempted to imply a right to take
military measures to enforce the resolution, at least at the time of its adop-
tion. The resolution itself affirmed the "sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of Iraq,""' a fact reflected in the statement of the
United States representative on the Council who said that "[i]t is not the role
or intention of the Security Council to interfere in the internal affairs of any
country."'4 5 Even if the P3' 46 had wanted a more forthright resolution, the
representative of China made clear the views of several members on the
Council that, despite the exception built into Article 2(7),147 they viewed it as
a concrete norm prohibiting intervention in the internal affairs of a coun-
try. 1
48
Nevertheless, the momentum towards intervention proceeded apace so
that, within three days of the adoption of Resolution 688, Western politicians
were proposing a military operation to protect the Kurds in a "safe haven" in
the north of Iraq. Prime Minister Major relied on Resolution 688 as justify-
142. Cuba, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
143. China and India.
144. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688
(1991).
145. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 57, U.N. Doc. S/PV 2982 (1992). See also
France, id. at 53; U.K., id. at 63.
146. The Western permanent members on the Council, that is, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France.
147. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7. This prohibits the UN from intervening "in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State." However, this principle
of non-intervention "shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
148. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 54-55 U.N. Doc. S/PV 2982 (1992). See also
India, id. at 62; USSR, id. at 59-60; Zimbabwe, id. at 31; Cuba, id. at 42.
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ing such an operation, stating that the United Kingdom's view was that no
new resolution was needed. 49 This was supported by President Bush. 5° De-
spite Iraq's objections that a military operation was a violation of interna-
tional law,' 5' in "Operation Provide Comfort" 15,000 Western troops 152 were
sent into northern Iraq to create a Kurdish safe area supported by the impo-
sition of a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel. 5 3 The troops stayed for a
relatively short period of time in April and May 1991, to be replaced by UN
guards under an agreement between Iraq and the UN Secretary General. 154
However, the no-fly zone was maintained by France, the United States, and
the United Kingdom. An additional no-fly zone was added south of the 32nd
parallel in southern Iraq in August 1992 following continued atrocities
against minorities there, particularly the Marsh Arabs.'55 It was in defending
this new no-fly zone that United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd,
when questioned about the legal basis of these operations in the absence of
an express Security Council mandate, stated that "[n]ot every action that a
British Government or an American Government or a French Government
takes has to be underwritten by a specific provision in a UN resolution pro-
vided we comply with international law. International law recogni[z]es ex-
treme humanitarian need,' '156 while still emphasizing that the military actions
undertaken were "in support" of Resolution 688.157
The introduction of reliance on "extreme humanitarian need" brought to
the fore the dormant, 15 many would argue discredited,'59 doctrine of hu-
149. Statement by the UK Prime Minister: A Safe Haven for the Kurds, UK FCO Press
Office, Apr. 8, 1991, in IRAQ AND KUWAIT: THE HOSTILITIES AND THEIR AFTERMATH 774
(Marc Weller ed., 1993) [hereinafter IRAQ AND KUWAIT].
150. The United States President's News Conference, April 16, 1991, Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents, Vol. 27, No. 16, in IRAQ AND KUWAIT, supra note 149, at 717.
151. See U.N. Doc. S/22531 (1991).
152. These included American, French, British, Dutch, and Italian troops.
153. See IRAQ AND KUWAIT, supra note 149, at 714-16.
154. See U.N. Doc. S/22531, supra note 151.
155. See IRAQ AND KUWAIT, supra note 149, at 723-25.
156. Id. at 723-24.
157. Today (NBC television broadcast, August 19, 1992). See also UK FCO spokesman,
Aug. 20, 1992, both in IRAQ AND KUWAIT, supra note 149, at 723-24.
158. See Dino Kritsiotis, Developing Approaches Towards Legitimising Intervention on
Humanitarian Grounds, 2 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 91 (1997); FERNANDO R. TdSON,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 1997); Richard
B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive
Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229 (John N. Moore ed., 1974);
W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the lbos, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).
159. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 338-42. See also Michael Akehurst, The Use of
Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad, 5 INT'L REL. 3, 10-16 (1977); Derek W.
Bowett, The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad, in THE CURRENT LEGAL
REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 39, 49-51 (A. Cassese ed., 1986); Rosalyn Higgins, Inter-
vention and International Law, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 38 (Hedley Bull ed.,
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manitarian intervention as a customary right of States acting outside the um-
brella of the UN. In September 1996, with Iraqi forces entering into the
Kurdish zone, the United States responded by missile attacks from bombers
and warships. In justifying these attacks, both the United States and the
United Kingdom tended to echo reliance on humanitarian intervention as
well as the "threat" represented by Iraq, rather than on any Security Council
mandate. President Clinton stated that the aim of the action was to make
"Saddam pay a price for the latest act of brutality, reducing his ability to
threaten his neighbors and American interests.,' Prime Minister John Ma-
jor said "[w]hat we are concerned about is any external threats he produces
and repression of his own people-and its against that the United States
acted,"'' in expressing his full support for Operation Desert Strike. 62
Thus, the legal basis for the initial military intervention in northern Iraq
and subsequent actions which continue the policy of protection of the Kurds,
and to a lesser extent, the Shias, is either Resolution 688 or the alleged cus-
tomary right of humanitarian intervention. The purpose of this article is not
to provide a definitive analysis of the latter justification, though it is worth
stating that the Western reliance of an alleged customary right was weak, re-
flecting the lack of opinio juris in State practice since 1945 for such a right.
The limited intervention which took place in northern Iraq may be a prece-
dent which will be built on in the future, possibly leading to a much more
limited form of humanitarian intervention. However, it is the aim here to as-
sess the uses and threats of force that have been undertaken against Iraq on
the basis of Security Council resolutions. Clearly, Resolution 688 does not
provide an express mandate to take military action. The question whether it
can be interpreted to imply such a right will be returned to later.
3. Enforcement of Disarmament
The airstrikes proposed in February 1998 and again in November 1998
by the United States and the United Kingdom were solely directed at the en-
forcement of the disarmament provisions of Security Council Resolution
687, adopted on April 3, 1991.163 This resolution, "the mother of all resolu-
tions,"' 64 not only continued economic sanctions against Iraq, it established
mechanisms to ensure Iraq made reparation to the victims of its aggression,
to ensure that the boundary dispute between Iraq and Kuwait was settled,
160. Nigel D. White, Commentary on the Protection of the Kurdish Safe-Haven: Opera-
tion Desert Strike, I J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 197 (1996).
161. Id.
162. As well as the missile strike, the United States extended the no-fly zone in the south
to the 33rd parallel. This action was again supported by the United Kingdom, but not by
France, whose aircraft share the policing of the no-fly zones. See id.
163. See S.C. Res. 687, supra note 2. Twelve votes in favor with one against (Cuba),
Yemen and Ecuador abstaining.
164. Frederick Kirgis, The Security Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 506,
525 (1995).
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and to ensure a significant level of Iraqi disarmament. Prior to the threats of
force in February and November 1998, there had been previous military
strikes to attempt to enforce Resolution 687. The main example occurred in
January 1993 by the United Kingdom, the United States, and French war-
planes. The January 1993 strikes were also aimed at Iraqi threats to the no-
fly zones, as were later limited strikes in April, July, and August 1993.165
More recently, despite Iraqi assurances of cooperation which narrowly
averted airstrikes in November 1998, its refusal to allow certain UNSCOM
inspections finally resulted in a seventy hour bombing and missile campaign,
codenamed "Operation Desert Fox" by the United States and the United
Kingdom, commencing on December 16, 1998.166
Security Council Resolution 687 was adopted at the end of the hostili-
ties under Chapter VII and imposed, among other things, disarmament con-
ditions on Iraq. In particular, it included a decision that "Iraq shall uncondi-
tionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless its chemical
and biological weapons,"'1 67 development, and support systems under the in-
ternational supervision of UNSCOM. The resolution also provided for a
similar intrusive investigation into nuclear weapons by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Security Council Resolution 715168 of Oc-
tober 11, 1991, also adopted under Chapter VII, provided for ongoing
monitoring and verification by inspections, overflight, and submission of re-
ports by Iraq of its continuing compliance with Resolution 687. The inten-
tion behind Resolution 715 was that once Iraq's weaponry of mass destruc-
tion was destroyed, Iraq would not be permitted to acquire fresh weaponry
and technology.
The extent of Iraq's non-compliance with Resolution 687 is staggering.
Resolution 687 provided for Iraq to report on its weaponry within fifteen
days. Within forty-five days, UNSCOM/IAEA should have been planning
the destruction of these weapons, such destruction occurring within another
forty-five days of Security Council approval of such plans. Within 120 days
of the resolution, a plan for future monitoring of Iraq's non-acquisition of
chemical, biological, and nuclear weaponry and technology should have
been approved by the Security Council. Despite this over-optimistic timeta-
ble, it is clear that Iraq has not even complied with the preliminary obliga-
tion to reveal all its weaponry and, although UNSCOM has supervised the
destruction of a great deal of hardware, there remains a hardcore of weap-
onry and technology to be accounted for and destroyed. 169 Even when this is
achieved, Resolution 715 provides for ongoing monitoring of Iraq by
165. See Christine Gray, After the Cease-Fire: Iraq, the Security Council and the Use of
Force, 68 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 135, 169 (1994).
166. See Michael Evans, US and Britain Strike at Iraq, TIMES (London), Dec. 17, 1998,
at 1.
167. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 2.
168. S.C. Res. 715, supra note 3.
169. See U.N. Doc. S/22531, supra note 151.
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UNSCOM. In light of this, the frustration which led to the airstrikes in 1993
and December 1998, and the threats of February and November 1998, are
understandable, but this does not necessarily mean that such uses or threats
of force are lawful.
It is clear, legally speaking, that airstrikes to enforce the disarmament
provisions of Security Council Resolution 687 can only be justified as an
action under the collective security umbrella of Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. There is no claimed residual customary right to threaten or use force
against Iraq-this includes claimed rights to self-defense, or the more con-
troversial doctrine of humanitarian intervention put forward by the United
States in June 1993 and by the United States and the United Kingdom in
September 1996. This is reflected in the fact that the United States' and the
United Kingdom's legal justifications for the threats of force made in Febru-
ary 1998 and again in November 1998 are solely based upon Security Coun-
cil resolutions. The only other argument, one of national self-interest, stated
by Secretary of State Albright 7 ' is clearly a non-legal justification and, in
many ways, a recognition that if the arguments based on Security Council
resolutions are unsustainable, then there was no real legal basis for the pro-
posed military operations.
However, while there was no additional legal basis put forward for the
February and November 1998 threats of force, in January 1993, when air-
strikes were undertaken, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defense
argued self-defense of allied aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones imposed by
the West to protect the Kurds and the Shias. 17 This must be seen as a very
weak attempt to base military action on self-defense and reflects the fact that
the purposes of the January 1993 strikes were uncertain in that they seemed
to be both the enforcement of Resolution 688, by enforcing the no-fly zones
purportedly established under the auspices of that resolution, and the en-
forcement of Iraqi compliance with the disarmament provisions of Resolu-
tion 687.172 Self-defense of warplanes flying over Iraq can only be accepted
as a legal justification if those planes had the legal right to be there in the
first place. "This depends on the legality of the no-fly zones,"' 73 which, as
has been shown above, were imposed outside the rubric of Security Council
resolutions.'7 4 There was no repeat of the self-defense argument in the dis-
armament crises of February 1998 or in November and December 1998. As
will be seen, the United States and the United Kingdom argued that their
right to threaten force and use force if necessary was based on Security
Council resolutions.
170. See Vulliamy, supra note 4.
171. Statement by the UK Secretary of State for Defense, Jan. 13, 1993, in IRAQ AND
KUWAIT, supra note 149, at 738.
172. See Gray, supra note 165, at 169.
173. Id. at 168.
174. See id. at 168.
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B. The Extent of the Decentralized Collective Security System
In all the airstrikes, missile attacks, and threats of such outlined above,
there has been no attempt by the main progenitors, the United States and the
United Kingdom, or by any other State, to resurrect the argument made by
various jurists 175 during the original conflict in 1991 that the operation
against Iraq was an action taken in collective self-defense of Kuwait, and not
under the collective security umbrella of the UN. 176
States viewed the Gulf operation as coming under the collective security
system and not under collective self-defense. 177 The United Kingdom and the
United States had originally placed their troops in Saudi Arabia after the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in preparation for action in collective self-defense
at the request of the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 17' They
maintained that this right was unaffected by Resolution 661171 of August 6,
1990, which had imposed comprehensive sanctions against Iraq,' despite
the wording of Article 51 which states, in relevant part, that the right of self-
defense persists "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security."' 8 ' What the United States and the
United Kingdom were concerned about was preserving their right of collec-
tive self-defense in the event of the Security Council only being able to im-
pose economic sanctions. If the Security Council had stopped there, with the
United States and the United Kingdom unable to persuade it to authorize
military enforcement action, then according to these two States they still had
the right of collective self-defense. Of course, if Security Council authority
for the use of force was forthcoming, then these arguments were simply on
record for the future. With the adoption of a resolution authorizing the use of
force to remove Iraq from Kuwait,'82 the legal basis of the UN operation
175. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 392, 397 (7th ed., 1997); Eugene V. Rostow, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International
and Foreign Relations Law, Continued, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 506, 506-10 (1991); Oscar Schac-
ter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 459-60 (1991); R.
Lavalle, The Law of the United Nations and the Use of Force Under the Relevant Security
Council Resolutions of 1990 and 1991 to Resolve the Persian Gulf Crisis, XXIII NETH. Y.B.
INT'L L. 3, 62 (1992).
176. Authority for the "Collective Security System" is found under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter.
177. Just as States had viewed the Korean operation in 1950, which in many ways was a
precedent for the Gulf operation, as a collective security operation. DEREK W. BowETT,
UNITED NATIONS FORCES 45-47 (1964).
178. See U.N. Doc. S/21492 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/21501 (1990).
179. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2933d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. SIRES/661
(1990).
180. See, e.g., Prime Minister Thatcher's Statement in the House of Commons, Hansard,
H.C., 6th ser., vol. 7, 737. For the US position, see U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2937th mtg. at 22,
U.N. Doc. S/PV 2937 (1992).
181. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
182. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 678].
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against Iraq was Article 42.83 In other words, it was a UN collective security
operation, not an operation in collective self-defense. Once Resolution 678
was secured authorizing the use of force against Iraq, the United States and
the United Kingdom, and other members of the Security Council, indeed
even those opposing the force, referred to it as a UN operation. As with the
UN mandated Korean military operation in 1950, there was overwhelming
opinio juris that the military operations were United Nations military opera-
tions.184 This is further shown by the fact that the war against Iraq was for-
mally brought to a close by Security Council resolutions, principally Reso-
lution 687, which contained elaborate and intrusive provisions for
disarmament.' 8 5
The legality of the decentralized system has been discussed more fully
elsewhere.' 86 Although not matching the original Charter scheme, the decen-
tralized military option,'87 which has been developed by the Security Coun-
cil to deal both with acts of aggression' 88 and threats to the peace, 189 is a law-
ful development of its powers to maintain or restore international peace and
security. 19" Although the system has several deficiencies, not the least of
which is the voluntary nature of States' involvement, it must not be forgotten
that the original Charter scheme was by no means ideal,' 9' based as it was on
183. U.N. Charter article 42 permits the Security Council to "take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."
U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
184. See Nigel D. White & Ozlem 01gen, The Security Council and the Decentralised
Military Option: Constitutionality and Function, XLIV NETH. INT'L L.R. 378, 392-96 (1997).
185. See S.C. Res. 687, supra note 2 See also S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess.,
2987th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (1991).
186. See White & Ulgen, supra note 184.
187. See Torsten Stein, Decentralized International Law Enforcement: The Changing
Role of the State as Law Enforcement Agent, in ALLOCATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
AUTHORITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 107 (Jorst Delbruc ed., 1995).
188. See S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/83
(1950) (Korea).
189. See S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3415th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794
(1992) (Somalia); S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3191st mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc
S/RES/816 (1993); S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/836 (1993); S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1031 (1995) (Bosnia); S.C. Res. 929, 49th Sess., 3329th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/929 (1994) (Rwanda); S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413d mtg. at 2, U.N.
Doc S/RES/940 (1994) (Haiti); S.C. Res. 1080, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3713d mtg. at 2, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1080 (1996) (Zaire); S.C. Res. 1101, U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., 3758th mtg. at 2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES 1101 (1997) (Albania).
190. See T.D. Gill, Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Secu-
rity Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, 26 NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. 33, 58 (1995). But see John Quigley, The United States and the United Nations
in the Persian Gulf War: New Order or Disorder?, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 20-28 (1992). In
particular, in the current system, as developed by the Security Council, there are no agree-
ments for the provision of armed forces as provided for in Article 43 of the Charter, nor is
their any control of the operation by the Military Staff Committee as provided for by Article
47.
191. What constitutes an ideal collective security system is the subject of debate. See,
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an unrealistic assumption about great power unity both in the Security
Council and the Military Staff Committee. Furthermore, there is evidence
that the Council is tightening up its control of its military enforcement op-
erations culminating in its precise, renewable mandate given to the multina-
tional force in Albania in March 1997.192
The decentralized military option outlined above, though not complying
with the strict wording of the UN Charter, is lawful though still weak. How-
ever, although the use of force in 1991 by the Coalition was lawful, it does
not signify that all subsequent threats and uses of force against Iraq are law-
ful. The system is loose and decentralized but there are clear limits to it. In
terms of the crises in February and November 1998, it is arguable that those
limits have been passed by those States wishing to threaten or use force sim-
ply because they do no have a mandate from the Security Council to do so.
The collective security system developed by the Security Council under
pressure from powerful States does already benefit those States greatly. To
attempt to stretch the system further to give more latitude to those States
wishing to use force, as seems to be the desire of the United States and the
United Kingdom in the confrontations after the end of the Gulf Conflict of
1991, will result in a shattering of that system and an end to a Security
Council with the power to authorize military action. The collective security
system is still dependent on Council authorization to threaten or use force;
where there is no authorization, there is no legal basis. That this principle
applies to both threats and uses of force is clear since as it has been shown
above both are equally unlawful in the absence of a saving justification, in
this case, Council authorization. It then boils down to a question of whether
the panoply of resolutions adopted against Iraq contain such an authoriza-
tion.
The following sections examine the various levels of possible justifica-
tion derived from Security Council resolutions in order to assess the legality
of each level. Each level involves a greater degree of decentralization than
the last in that each one involves a further move away from the requirement
that there is an express UN resolution authorizing the threat or use of force.
Each level will be assessed in relation to the most recent crisis in Iraq which
led to the threats of force against it in February and November 1998, as well
as the use of force in December 1998 and some of the previous uses of force
against Iraq that have occurred since 1991.
1. An Express Authorization?
The requirements of the collective security system are clearly satisfied if
there is an express authorization by the Security Council to threaten or use
e.g., INIS L. CLAUDE, POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 110-68 (1962); Charles A. Kup-
chan, The Case for Collective Security, in COLLECTIVE SECURITY: BEYOND THE COLD WAR 41,
42-44 (George W. Downs ed., 1997).
192. See White & Ulgen, supra note 184, at 409.
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force in that the constitutional link between the Charter and military opera-
tion is made. In the case of Iraq, the only express authorization is to be found
in Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990. This authorized the Coalition to
"use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolu-
tion 660 and all subsequent resolutions and to restore international peace and
security in the area."' 93
Does this give States an open-ended mandate to threaten or use force
against Iraq? Resolution 678 was cited as the legal basis for the airstrikes of
January 1993 on the grounds that the violation of Resolution 687, containing
inter alia, provisions on disarmament, re-triggered the original mandate
given to Coalition States. The Secretary General stated in a Press Release
that "the raid ... and the force that carried out the raid, have received a
mandate from the Security Council according to Resolution 678 and the
cause of the raid was the violation by Iraq of Resolution 687."' 9 This argu-
ment was repeated in justifying the threatened enforcement of Resolution
687 in February 1998. The United Kingdom is reported to have stated that
"Iraq's refusal to allow the inspectors free access constituted a breach of
[Resolution 687]. The cease-fire, therefore, no longer applied and the UN
fell back on Resolution 678. '95
Resolution 678 of November 1990 related to the initial use of force
against Iraq.196 Any subsequent threats or uses of force needed to be man-
dated afresh, otherwise the mandate is simply too open-ended to be practical.
To allow such a system would be to sanction the permanent delegation of
authority for the purpose of dealing with a threat to or breach of the peace. If
the United Kingdom's position is correct, then would there ever be a time
when Resolution 678 was not operative in the absence of the United States
and the United Kingdom renouncing their status as contractors for the Secu-
rity Council? Even then, could other States take up the sword? Resolution
678 cannot realistically be used as the legal basis for threats or uses of force
subsequent to the formal cease-fire in Resolution 687. Furthermore, when
Resolution 678 authorized the enforcement of Resolution 660 and all subse-
quent resolutions, it was clearly referring to resolutions adopted between
Resolutions 660 and 678, the aim of which was to force Iraq out of Kuwait.
In addition, member states of the Council voting for Resolution 678 did not
interpret the phrase "and to restore international peace and security to the
area" as permitting any wider use of force than pushing Iraq out of Ku-
wait. 197 Having said that, Resolution 687 itself does confirm all previous Se-
193. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990).
194. IRAQ AND KUWAIT, supra note 149, at 741-42.
195. Michael Binyon, Britain Says New Resolution Required, TIMES (London), Feb. 19,
1998.
196. See Marc Weller, US Takes Perilous Path in Show of Military Might, TIMES (Lon-
don), Feb. 3, 1998, at 14.
197. See Statements made by Council members at the adoption of S.C. Res. 678, U.N.
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curity Council resolutions on Iraq, including Resolution 678. However, it is
unlikely that this was intended to keep Resolution 678 alive as a resolution
which continues to authorize the use of force,' 98 particularly in light of the
other provisions of Resolution 687 which will be considered below, and also
by the fact that Resolution 687 affirmed previous resolutions "except as ex-
pressly changed ... to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a for-
mal cease-fire."' 99 When Resolution 687 was adopted on April 3, 1991,
members of the Council emphasized that those States acting under Resolu-
tion 678 should withdraw their forces as soon as possible after the estab-
lishment of UNIKOM 2°°on the disputed frontier and after Iraq had accepted
Resolution 687, thereby creating a formal cease-fire. 20' Resolution 678 sim-
ply continued until Iraqi acceptance of the resolution and an unhindered
withdrawal by Coalition forces took place.202 Iraq accepted Resolution 687
on April 6, 1991,203 and the Coalition ground forces withdrew in July
1991.204 There was no mention made at the adoption of Resolution 687 by
the Coalition States of a continuing right to use force. 205 Furthermore, both
China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic made it clear at the time
Resolution 687 was adopted that it was the task of the Security Council to
ensure implementation of its provisions. 0 6
Moving forward to the February 1998 crisis when the United States,
with United Kingdom support, threatened to use force against Iraq to ensure
SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 70-85, U.N. Doc. S/PV 2963 (1990). See, in particular, the
Statement by UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd at 78: "There is no ambiguity about what
the Council requires in this resolution and in previous resolutions. We require that Iraq com-
ply fully with the terms of resolution 660 (1990) and all later resolutions and withdraw all its
forces unconditionally to the positions on which they stood on 1 August. This means that
withdrawal must be complete. If not, the Member States, acting with the Government of Ku-
wait, are authorized to use such force as may be necessary to compel compliance." Id. See
also id. at 101 (statement by US Secretary of State James Baker).
198. See Gray, supra note 165, at 155.
199. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 182.
200. The Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission.
201. See U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. at 85, 111 U.N. Doc. S/PV 2981 (1991).
202. This is in accordance with S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2978th mtg. at 2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (1991), which continued the authorization in Resolution 678 (1990)
"for the period required for Iraq to comply with the ... obligations" contained in Resolution
686, which related to the abandonment of the use of force in the conflict by Iraq, to rescind its
annexation of Kuwait, release detainees and prisoners of war, and identify minefields. Reso-
lution 686 was superseded by Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991. See Gray, supra note 165, at
139.
203. See U.N. Doc. S/22456 (1991).
204. See Gray, supra note 165, at 144.
205. Only Yemen, who has persistently objected to the open-ended nature of Resolution
678 (1990) and had voted against its adoption and had abstained on Resolution 687 (1991),
stated that it saw Resolution 678 as still giving an open mandate to the Coalition: "These are
the forces that decided to wage battle, using the authority of the Council, and these are the
forces that will decide upon the cessation of the operation." U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st
mtg. at 36, U.N. Doc. S/PV 2981 (1991).
206. See id. at 95 (China), 98 (USSR).
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compliance with the disarmament provisions of Resolution 687, Prime Min-
ister Tony Blair was quoted as saying that not only did existing UN resolu-
tions give ample authority for military strikes, this authority has been
strengthened by the adoption of Resolution 1154 on March 2, 1998.201 This
Resolution was adopted, in part, to endorse the Memorandum of Under-
standing between Iraq and the UN of February 23, 1998.208 Although
adopted under Chapter VII, there is no use of the accepted UN terminology
for authorizing the use of force. Consistently, there has been use of the
phrase "necessary means" or "necessary measures., 209 Stating that Iraqi non-
compliance would have "severest consequences" is not clear enough. In ad-
dition, there is no "authorization" to threaten or use force. If this is thought
to be too precious an argument then the last paragraph states clearly that the
Council (not individual members) will "ensure the implementation of this
resolution. 2 1 ° Certainly, at the meeting at which Resolution 1154 was
adopted, not only did Russia and China make it clear that the resolution did
not automatically authorize any State to use force against Iraq in the event of
non-compliance,2 1 so also did the vast majority of the members of the Coun-
cil, although with varying degrees of clarity. 212 The United Kingdom at-
tempted to keep the possibility of further unilateral threats and uses of force
alive by referring to the success of "diplomacy backed by the willingness to
use force,''213 which led to the Memorandum of Understanding, a phrase
echoing that used by the UN Secretary General. On Resolution 1154, the
United Kingdom simply repeated the wording of the resolution that any
violation would result in the "severest consequences" for Iraq.21 4 The United
States representative was similarly oblique as to the nature and source of
these "consequences," stating that Iraq would face "certain punishment and
continued isolation" if Iraq chose not to "abide by the rules of civilized be-
havior. '215 On balance, it is clear that Resolution 1154 does not authorize the
207. See S.C. Res. 1154, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3858th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1 154 (1998).
208. See supra note 1.
209. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 678, supra note 182.
210. Sec. Res. 1154, supra note 207.
211. See U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3858th mtg. at 14, 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV 3858 (1998).
"The resolution clearly states that it is precisely the Security Council which will directly en-
sure its implementation, including the adoption of appropriate decisions. Therefore, any hint
of automaticity with regard to the application of force has been excluded; that would not be
acceptable for the majority of the Council's members." (Russia).
212. See id. Costa Rica at 4-5; Brazil at 7; Sweden at 9; Gabon at 9; Kenya at 10; Japan
(one of the sponsors along with the UK) at 11; Slovenia at 12-13; France at 15; Gambia at 18.
213. Id. at4.
214. See id. See also Secretary General at 3. United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Robin
Cook seemed to support the idea of automatic airstrikes saying that "there was already exist-
ing legal authority for military action to enforce existing undertakings from Iraq, and that has
not changed by ... resolution [1154]." Interview with Radio 4 (UK) (Mar. 3, 1998).
215. See U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3858th mtg., supra note 211, at 16. However, the
United States Assistant Secretary of State James P. Rubin said on March 3, 1998, of Resolu-
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automatic threat or use of force. First, the text is not clear enough; second,
the vast majority of Security Council members, including three permanent
members, do not regard it as such; and third, when the dialogue between Iraq
and UNSCOM again broke down in early August 1998, the issue was dealt
with by the Security Council. The Security Council rejected Baghdad's an-
nouncement that it would no longer cooperate with UNSCOM.216
2. A Liberal Interpretation?
Is Resolution 687 by itself sufficient to establish the legality of the 1998
threats of force? Several arguments against this have been examined in the
above section. Furthermore, Resolution 687, which was adopted under
Chapter VII, provides in its last paragraph that the Security Council "decides
to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be re-
quired for the implementation of this resolution and to secure peace and se-
curity in the area.''217 "Further steps" is not an authorization to use or
threaten force. Furthermore, the paragraph provides for the Council to decide
what further steps are necessary, not individual members. This also seems to
contradict the argument that Resolution 678 is the legal basis for any mili-
tary strikes. Resolution 687 seems to replace both Resolution 678 and
Resolution 686218 of March 2, 1991, which contained the temporary cease-
fire. Resolution 687 appears to be the governing resolution, which has within
it a paragraph which provides for further steps to be taken by the Security
Council if there is not compliance with the resolution. 219 Simply put, Reso-
lution 687, like Resolution 1154, cannot be interpreted as allowing for air-
strikes without further Council authority.22 °
tion 1154 that "severest consequences" was the "diplomatic code for military action" and
"that military force will ensue if Iraq violates this agreement." Barton Gelman, U.S. Avoids
Military Threat After Iraqi Defiance: Stress is Placed on Economic Sanctions, WASH. POST,
Aug. 7, 1998, at 1.
216. See U.N. Daily Highlights (visited Aug. 6, 1998) <http://www.unoteorg/cgi-
bin/dh.pl>. Council members took different positions on how the Security Council should re-
spond. China emphasized dialogue, while the United States demanded "strong" action, but
both seemed to be in accord that it was the Security Council's decision.
217. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 2.
218. S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2978th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686
(1991).
219. This is made clear by Brazil at the meeting at which S.C. Res. 1154, U.N. SCOR,
53rd Sess., 3858th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1154 (1998) was adopted when it stated "that
the question of the implementation of the conditions for the ceasefire with Iraq remains firmly
under the wing, so to speak, of the United Nations and the Security Council. Only the Secu-
rity Council has the authority to determine if, when and under what conditions the formal
ceasefire it declared on 3 April 1991 holds or not." U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3858th mtg. at 7,
U.N. Doc. S/PV 3858 (1998).
220. See Gray, supra note 165, at 155.
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3. The Tacit Consent of the Security Council?
It is arguable that the basis of the January 1993 airstrikes was not simply
Resolution 687 alone, which cannot by itself be authority for airstrikes, but
also the tacit support of the Security Council. Two days before the airstrikes,
the Security Council condemned Iraqi defiance of Resolution 687 and
warned Iraq of the "serious consequences that will flow from continued defi-
ance."22 Although not a formal resolution, this could be construed as an
authorization by the Security Council for the use of force by willing States.
However, again the language is too ambiguous to give the airstrikes a firm
legal basis. It is better viewed as a case where the Council, as with Resolu-
tion 1154, was prepared to threaten Iraq with unspecified consequences but
not expressly authorize the threat or use of force. Furthermore, "Security
Council statements do not have the legal status of a resolution, 222 and
clearly, if the Western States wanted express authority, they should have
sought a formal resolution. Although there was no suggestion of any infor-
mal "go-ahead" in the February 1998 crisis,223 there was reportedly a lack of
vociferous opposition to airstrikes in November 1998 from France, Russia,
and China in informal Security Council discussions immediately prior to
Iraq's agreement to resume cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA on
November 14, 1998.224 However, in the face of Iraqi decisions of August 5
and October 31, 1998, to withdraw cooperation, the Security Council as a
whole, had adopted condemnatory resolutions under Chapter VII of the
Charter.225 The only coercive elements of these resolutions were in the form
of provisions making it clear to Iraq that without its cooperation on disar-
mament, there would be no comprehensive review of the sanctions regime.
The lack of Security Council approval for the actual bombings and airstrikes
that took place between December 16 and December 19, 1998, was revealed
when the Council met formally on December 16 after the United States and
the United Kingdom had carried out their threats and had launched their at-
tacks on Iraq. Six members of the Council, including Russia and China,
spoke out unambiguously against the attacks on the basis of lack of Security
Council authority.226 Only Japan, alongside the United States and the United
Kingdom, openly argued in terms of a mandate under existing Council
221. SC/5536 (1993), in IRAQ AND KUWAIT, supra note 149, at 736-37. See also SC/5534
(1993), id. at 736.
222. Gray, supra note 165, at 155.
223. See White, supra note 160, at 202-03. Nor for the September 1996 military actions.
See id.
224. See Vulliamy, supra note 96, at 8.
225. See S.C. Res. 1194, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3924th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/l194 (1998); S.C. Res. 1205, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3939th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1205 (1998).
226. See U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3955th mtg. at 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/PV 3955 (1998). Rus-
sia, China, Costa Rica, Sweden, Brazil and Kenya.
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resolutions.227
Of course, the United States and the United Kingdom may point to the
difficulty, if not the impossibility, of securing a Security Council resolution
which allows them to threaten or use force, given the potential vetoes of
China and Russia in particular. Indeed, their attempts to secure a more force-
ful resolution in June 1996 228and November 1997229 failed, frustrating facts
which may well have led to the United States and the United Kingdom act-
ing without Security Council authority in February 1998, and again in No-
vember and December 1998. Unfortunately for those States, the system of
collective security, which they have helped to shape, requires, at a bare
minimum, such an enabling resolution. As Rosalyn Higgins states, "[t]here
is no entitlement in the hands of individual Members of the United Nations
to enforce prior Security Council resolutions by the use of force. ' 230
4. Simply a Chapter VII Resolution?
If the resolution, as with Resolutions 687 and 1154, contains no refer-
ence to the threat or use of force as regards enforcement of its provisions on
disarmament,231 and none is supported by the Security Council as a whole,
227. See id. France and the remaining members condemned Iraq while not clearly ap-
proving or disapproving of the airstrikes.
228. At the meeting at which S.C. Res. 1060, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3672d mtg. at 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1060 (1996) was unanimously adopted, (3672) the original draft proposed
by the US and the UK, U.N. Doc. S/1996/426, was amended with the slightest suggestion that
a breach of the cease-fire may re-ignite the Coalition's mandate of 1990 being deleted. See
original draft of resolution 1060 U.N. Doc. S/1996/426, the penultimate preambular para-
graph, which was deleted, recalled "that resolution 687 (1991) established a cease-fire and
provided for the conditions essential for the restoration of peace and security to the area." The
Russian representative expressed his relief "that the members of the Security Council have
been able to resist the temptation to use threatening language and an approach based on
force," U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3672d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV 3672 (1996).
229. In S.C. Res. 1137, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3831st mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/i137 (1997), Iraqi intransigence led the Council to tighten sanctions by imposing
travel restrictions on Iraqi officials. Although Resolution 1137, sponsored by various States
including the US and the UK, warned Iraq of "serious consequences" in the event of non-
compliance, it made the Council's control of the situation clear by stating its "firm intention
to take further measures as may be required for the implementation of this resolution." The
Russian Representative stated of Resolution 1137 that it "rules out the possibility of abusing
the authority of the Security Council and the United Nations to justify any attempts to use
force." Id. See also id. at 10 (France). "The Council's authority is maintained. The Council is
still master of its judgements and future actions". The UK, id. at 12, obliquely referred to
"further measures" in the event of non-compliance, the US, id. at 11, to "consequences." The
attempt, in this resolution and in S.C. Res. 1154, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3858th mtg. at 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 154 (1998), to stretch the diplomatic code so that "serious consequences"
can now be read as authorizing the use of force seems to have failed.
230. Rosalyn Higgins, General Course, 230 HAGUE RECUEtLI, 330-31 (1991).
231. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 2, does use the phrase "necessary measures" in paragraph
4 in relation to the inviolability of the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, but
makes it clear that the Security Council will "take as appropriate all necessary measures to
that end in accordance with the Charter." Id. See also S.C. Res. 773, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
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then surely this was an insufficient legal basis for the threat of force against
Iraq in February 1998. This is also true of all the Security Council resolu-
tions adopted in between Resolutions 687 and 1154 which have condemned
Iraqi intransigence on the disarmament provisions of 687, but have not
authorized the use or threat of force. This includes Resolutions 707,232
715,233 1060,234 1115,235 1134,236 and 1137.237 Furthermore, no resolution
adopted after resolution 1154 has mandated such coercive measures.
238
5. Any Security Council Resolution?
Security Council Resolution 688 seems to be the main basis of the
West's imposition of the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq in
1991 and 1992, and the enforcement of the northern safe-haven in 1991 by
ground troops and again in September 1996 by airstrikes. Resolution 688
does not provide for enforcement and, although there is a finding of a threat
to the peace, there is no explicit Chapter VII reference. This resolution
clearly does not entitle States to use force or threaten it for there is no ex-
press authorization for such measures. To accept the contrary would mean
any State could take upon itself the right to use force to enforce a Security
Council resolution whenever it perceived that the resolution required en-
forcement. This is not mere delegation, but would constitute unilateral or
multilateral action outside the UN system.
It is thus clear that the threats of force against Iraq in February and No-
vember 1998 had no legal basis in Security Council resolutions. For the
United States and the United Kingdom to successfully make that claim
would require an express mandate from the Security Council. In all other
situations analyzed above, the constitutional link between the Security
3108th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/773 (1992). See Gray, supra note 165, at 149, who States
that paragraph 4 of Resolution 687 would not "justify unilateral resort to force by members of
the coalition," but at footnote 75 raises the possibility that a further attack against Kuwait may
justify a response in collective self-defense despite the fact that the Security Council is deal-
ing with the matter under Resolution 687. This would certainly accord with the UK and US's
view, Stated earlier in the crisis in relation to Resolution 661 (1990), that the continuation of
sanctions (in this case by Resolution 687) would not prevent the right of self-defense in the
event of an armed attack.
232. S.C. Res. 707, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2978th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/Res/707
(1991).
233. S.C. Res. 715, supra note 3.
234. S.C. Res. 1060, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3672d mtg. at I, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1060
(1996).
235. S.C. Res. 1115, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3792d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. SIRES/hIl5
(1997).
236. S.C. Res. 1134, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3826th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1134
(1997).
237. S.C. Res. 1137, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3831st mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I137
(1997).
238. See U.N. 3955th mtg., supra note 226.
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Council and the military operation is simply not made and the de minimis
conditions necessary for a basic UN collective security action have not been
fulfilled.
Only Resolution 678 of 1990 clearly authorizes the use of force, but as
seen, this is no longer operative; it only applied to the initial military action
against Iraq in 1991. The delegation of authority to the Coalition ended with
the formal cease-fire in Resolution 687 of 1991, and there has been no re-
vival of it since. Security Council Resolutions 687 to 1205 have kept the Se-
curity Council as a whole in charge of the situation, there being no further
delegation to States. These resolutions are simply Chapter VII resolutions,
which are not to be enforced by military measures except under the further
authority of the Council. The British and the Americans may argue that
Resolution 687 needs enforcing and that this is the only way to make Iraq
comply, however, this ignores the fact that first the Council decided in
Resolution 687 not to expressly authorize military force for the enforcement
of its resolution and, second, Resolution 687 continues sanctions against Iraq
which will only be lifted when Iraq has complied with the resolution. In
other words, there is provision for enforcement. As Christine Gray states, the
cease-fire in 687 was not put under the control of one State or a group of
States, it was put under the control of the Security Council as a whole. 239 It is
therefore up to the Security Council to enforce it, whether by sanctions alone
or by authorizing the threat or use of airstrikes.
C. After-Effects
This does not absolve Iraq of its responsibilities to the Council, nor in-
deed does it alter the fact that Iraq has behaved in a highly inappropriate
manner towards UNSCOM. What it does mean is that the United States and
the United Kingdom reacted unsuitably to Iraq's actions. It only remains to
decide what effects this illegality had on the Memorandum of Understanding
signed by Iraq and the Secretary General on February 23, 1998.
As discussed above, Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties' renders void all treaties brought about by threats or uses of force.
However, it would seem that the Memorandum would not fall foul of this.
There are various reasons for this. The first of these is that the threat of force
was not by the UN, indeed conspicuously outside of it. Kofi Annan did not
threaten force, the United States and the United Kingdom did. For Article 52
to bite, the coercion must be from the State negotiating the treaty, and this
did not happen here. Against this, it could be implied that Kofi Annan
adopted the threats of force in relation to Iraq and thus, as a signatory, he
was tainted by them. This would have to be implied from his statement that
"you can do a lot with diplomacy, but of course you can do a lot more with
239. See Gray, supra note 165, at 173.
240. See Article 52, supra note 52.
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diplomacy backed up by firmness and force."'24' It is very difficult to say if
this amounts to an adoption, or if he adopted them in negotiations with Iraq,
or only later. Either way, whether they were adopted or not could make no
difference in this case. This is because the threat must have been the reason
for the acceptance of the treaty, but in this case, it is unlikely that this was so
given that there were carrots offered as well as sticks shown. Iraq secured
"UNSCOM plus suits" and its objective of raising the issue of the ending of
sanctions. In addition, Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, ex-
pressly stated that the threats of force were not determinative in the conclu-
sion of the treaty; the diplomacy of Kofi Annan was the reason for the
agreement.242 This would preclude any reliance on Article 52 by Iraq at a
later stage.
The most important issue must be, however, that in accepting the
Memorandum, Iraq has imposed no new burdens on itself which were not
already imposed by Resolution 687. As a result, even if the agreement was
vitiated by the threats of force, the primary source of the obligation, the Se-
curity Council resolution, is still in force. Thus, the agreement makes no
practical difference to Iraq's obligations. Indeed, Iraq probably obtained a
better deal than it was entitled to by the addition of "suits" to UNSCOM and
the publicity for its campaign to remove UN sanctions. Indeed, Iraq feted the
agreement as a victory so it is highly unlikely that it could later be nullified
by the Iraqis on the grounds of Article 52.
IV. CONCLUSION
It only remains to decide what lessons and implications for international
law can be drawn from this combustible period. The reactions of States in
the affair and after, and in the Security Council meeting preceding the adop-
tion of Resolution 1154, are instructive in relation to the views of those
States on threats of force. While it is clear that in the February 1998 crisis
the United States and the United Kingdom, with the support of some other
States, notably Germany, Canada, Australia, Slovenia and Kuwait,243 consid-
ered it acceptable to threaten force, their views were not accepted by a siz-
able proportion of States. In addition to the statements of various States in
the Council mentioned above, China, Russia, Mexico, Pakistan, Malaysia
and, albeit obliquely, France and Egypt, all expressed their opposition to
threats and uses of force, reiterating the traditional rule in this very public
forum.2" After such a situation, it is refreshing to see States rally around the
prohibition.
241. A Turning Point for the UN? (visited Feb. 25, 1998) <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk>
(search term "Iraq").
242. See Iraq: UNSCOM Crisis 1998, supra note 108, at 42097.
243. The latter two expressing their support in the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 53d,
Sess., 3858th mtg. at 16, 23, U.N. Doc. S/PV 3858 (1998).
244. See id. at 14-20.
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The events described also brought into focus the dangers of threatening
force. From a situation between Iraq, the United States, the United Kingdom,
and UNSCOM, which had occurred before, events quickly spiraled out of
control towards a major conflict. By threatening force, the United States and
the United Kingdom raised the stakes and backed both themselves and Iraq
into comers from which force became increasingly likely. It caused an en-
trenchment of position on both sides, and this could well have prevented
earlier diplomatic settlement as both parties would see it as a climb down. It
is testament to the diplomatic skills of Kofi Annan that he managed to pro-
vide a way out for both sides in February 1998. Despite the Secretary Gen-
eral's placatory words directed at the United States and the United Kingdom
about the efficacy of diplomacy backed by force, the February 1998 crisis
reveals that, miraculously, diplomacy worked despite the threat of force.
Furthermore, diplomacy conducted looking down the barrel of a gun, even if
successful in producing an agreement, is likely to produce one that unravels
almost instantly. This is graphically illustrated by the repetition of the threats
in November 1998 and the final descent into violence in December 1998, as
the United States and the United Kingdom sought to maintain the credibility
of their threats of force. This clearly shows the snowballing effect of threats
of force and is a strong argument against accepting them de legeferenda.
What is also worrying is how the United States and the United King-
dom, despite a conspicuous lack of support from many nations, decided to
proceed unilaterally to enforce the will of the international community in
ways which were expressly rejected by that community. It is no longer suffi-
cient to point to Cold War politics to explain a lack of action from the Secu-
rity Council. It may be that, as in this case, there simply is no agreement on
the necessity to use force and, as such, the lack of a mandate from the Coun-
cil is actually reflective of the balance of international opinion. To proceed
unilaterally, irrespective of this, is to act only on behalf of self-interest, even
if it is cloaked in a fictive claim of international approval. That the United
States and the United Kingdom have done this, particularly in relation to pa-
riah States, is shown again by their recent actions and statements made to
Yugoslavia over Kosovo.24 5 This unilateralism should not be encouraged; it
is dangerous.
Unfortunately, it seems that this unilateralism is also creeping into the
interpretation of Security Council language. This is evidenced by the inter-
pretations of the phrase "severest consequences," as discussed above. The
debate on Resolution 1154 made it clear that phrase was not to be considered
analogous to "all necessary measures" and, as such, is not a mandate for the
threat or use of force. This has not prevented the United States and the
United Kingdom from later claiming, in direct contradiction to the under-
245. See Michael Evans, NATO to Train in Albania and Macedonia for Raids on Serb
Targets, TiMEtS (London), June 11, 1998, at 20; Michael Evans, NATO to Draw up Kosovo
Military Options, TnmEs (London), June 25, 1998, at 17; Chris Bird & Ian Black, Serbs Dare
West to Raise Stakes, GUARDIAN WKLY., Jan. 24, 1999, at 1.
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standing upon which Resolution 1154 was adopted, that Resolution 1154,
and in particular the phrase "severest consequences," is enough to mandate
them to take unilateral military action if they deem it expedient.' This is
duplicitous and can only be intended to gain support at home, as on the in-
ternational plane it is clear that this was not the intent of the resolution. If the
United States and the United Kingdom insist on providing their own inter-
pretations of phrases contradicting those already agreed to, this could have
very serious effects on cooperation and trust in the Security Council, which
would not be a positive development.
246. See, e.g., 3858 mtg., supra note 211, at 16.
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